Predictability of International Climate Finance under the Paris Agreement

1 Background

The necessity to support developing countries (Non-Annex-I Parties1) in their commitment to ambitious climate action has already been recognized by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992.2 According to Article 4, paragraph 3, developed countries shall support developing countries with financial resources for meeting their obligations and commitments under the Convention. In addition, the paragraph highlights adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds as underlying principles. Consequently, predictability has also been included in the Paris Agreement (PA). Article 9.5 further specifies the basic arrangements made between Parties under the Convention3:

“Developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties. Other Parties providing resources are encouraged to communicate biennially such information on a voluntary basis.”

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1 UNFCCC (2018a)
3 UN (2015), p. 13
Within the context of Article 9, paragraph 1 refers to the obligation of developed country Parties to financially support developing countries’ commitments in relation to both mitigation and adaptation, while paragraph 3 relates to developed countries’ obligation to take the lead in mobilizing funding from a variety of sources, noting the significant role of public funds. The challenge for the negotiations of the Paris Agreement Work Programme (PAWP)⁴ at the twenty-fourth Conference of the Parties (COP24) is to operationalize this principle. As per its current wording, Article 9.5 directly or indirectly specifies some elements of predictability in the context of the PA:

(a) **Actors:** It demands developed country Parties to provide ex-ante information on projected levels of financial support, including public finance, as available. Other Parties may participate voluntarily in the reporting, in case they also do or intend to provide climate finance to developing countries.

(b) **Information:** Information to be reported may be of quantitative or qualitative nature.

(c) **Modalities:** The requested information should be made available or updated every two years, presumably starting from 2020, when the PA comes into action.

In the process of specifying the details of Article 9.5, key aspects of these elements are still subject for negotiation at COP24. These include a final list of information that shall be provided and additions to the modalities under which reporting shall take place, including which institution(s) shall coordinate the process.

The process for negotiating the details of Article 9.5 under the PAWP formally began at COP21, when Parties decided “to initiate, at COP22, a process to identify the information to be provided by Parties, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Agreement with a view to providing a recommendation for consideration and adoption by the first [Conference of the Parties serving

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⁴UNFCCC (2018b)
as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement] (CMA)\(^5\). At COP22, the secretariat to the UNFCCC was mandated “to organize a round-table discussion among Parties on this matter in conjunction with SB46\(^6\) and to prepare a summary report of the meeting thereafter. Any further work on this matter was meant to commence from COP23, based on the outcomes of the round-table discussion. At COP23, the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) was asked “to consider, beginning at SBI48 and at any subsequent sessions on the PAWP, the identification of the information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement”\(^7\). Any progress made by SBI on the topic is then to be forwarded to COP24, which will hand over their recommendations as part of the overall PAWP to the CMA. Besides the SBI, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) has also been engaging in operationalising Article 9.5, based on their general mandate from COP21 to oversee any work conducted in relation to the PAWP.\(^8\) APA is therefore liaising with SBI on the matter before SBI will hand over its recommendations to COP24. In addition, the mandate of APA includes the possibility to forward recommendations directly to the CMA (see also Figure 1 for a schematic overview of the negotiation process since COP21).

The current 300-pages draft of the PAWP, reflecting the status quo of negotiations after the extraordinary Bangkok session of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB48-2), contains an informal note by the co-facilitators of SBI\(^9\) regarding Article 9.5 as well as submissions by several Parties or groups of Parties.\(^10\) While the different types of information to be included are discussed under SBI (Agenda

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\(^5\) Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 55
\(^6\) Decision 13/CP.22, paragraph 2
\(^7\) Decision 12/CP.23, paragraph 5
\(^8\) Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 9
\(^9\) Co-facilitators of SBI Agenda item 15: Mr. Edmund Mortimer (Australia) and Mr. Seyni Nafo (Mali). See SBI (2018), p. 3
\(^10\) UNFCCC (2018c), p. 153ff

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Figure 1: Negotiation process for Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement (own compilation)
Item 15), potential modalities on how those climate finance projections shall be reported are brought up by some negotiation groups under the APA (Agenda Item 8 (other matters)).\textsuperscript{11} In October 2018, the results from the Bangkok meeting were complemented by an informal joint reflection note by the presiding officers of the APA, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the SBI on matters relating to Article 9 of the PA.\textsuperscript{12} This note entails, among other elements, the draft decision text for consideration by the CMA 1 on Article 9.5 divided in four options and an annex with quantitative and qualitative information to be communicated, compiled on the basis of the Bangkok outcome. The note further outlines that the aims of the Katowice Climate Change Conference would be to agree upon a final list of information to be reported under Article 9.5, including a proposed structure, and to finalize the decision text, which also addresses modalities under which reporting shall take place (e.g. information to be submitted to the UNFCCC secretariat).

Negotiating the operationalisation of Article 9.5 in the past has shown that positions of developing and developed Parties on the matter differ. On the one hand, developing countries are calling for precise and reliable information on expected levels of climate finance in the light of their commitments made as part of their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and connected planning efforts. In addition, they also underline that making this information available will be important for securing political will at the national level for ambitious climate action. Furthermore, they want to discuss the modalities for providing, processing and reviewing Article 9.5 information. On the other hand, developed countries express general support but highlight limitations in making such information available well in advance. This is related to constraints imposed by budgetary cycles of public finance (e.g. annual or multi-annual programming cycles), limited availability of detailed information on envisaged spending (e.g. geographical areas, volume of leveraged private finance) or the fact that allocations to developing countries are demand-driven, meaning that allocations are also determined by a dialogue with recipient countries requiring flexibility.\textsuperscript{13} By raising these concerns, developed countries refer to their experiences on related reporting obligations with regard to long-term climate finance under the COP, i.e. the biennial communication of strategies and approaches for scaling up climate finance from 2014 to 2020 mandated by COP19.\textsuperscript{14}

This policy brief analyses the key elements of the current negotiations on Article 9.5, namely actors, information and modalities, and summarizes the different perspectives of negotiation groups. Furthermore, it provides a detailed overview of negotiation streams at COP24 that are relevant for ex-ante finance communication.

2 Key aspects of predictability of climate finance

2.1 Actors: Who provides information?

Article 9.5 entails an obligation for developed country Parties to provide ex-ante information about their climate finance provisions. The existing arrangements of biennial communication of strategies and approaches for scaling up climate finance from 2014 to 2020 also specifically requested the developed country Parties to provide information.

In addition, Article 9.5 encourages other Parties to voluntarily provide ex-ante information on climate finance. This refers to developing country Parties that are already supporting or plan to support other developing countries with financial resources. Data from the Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows (BA) suggests that South-South cooperation is already

\textsuperscript{11} Co-facilitators of APA Agenda item 8 (other matters): Ms. Baashan (Saudi Arabia) and Ms. Tyndall (New Zealand). See APA (2018a), p. 3

\textsuperscript{12} UNFCCC (2017a), p. 4f

\textsuperscript{13} Decision 3/CP. 19
an important component and of increasing relevance.\textsuperscript{15} According to the BA, climate finance flows among developing countries ranged between USD 5.9–9.1 billion in 2013 and USD 7.2–11.7 billion in 2014. Ex-ante projections of climate finance provisions from developing Parties would further enhance the recipient countries’ ability to plan their climate actions and highlights the engagement of developing Party donor countries.

Looking at the concept of predictability from a broader perspective reveals that some actors are formally not covered by the Article but have an assigned role in the climate finance landscape supporting the implementation of the PA. In the context of the developed countries’ goal to jointly mobilise USD 100 billion per year by 2020, different channels deliver climate finance: bilateral public finance, multilateral public finance, export credits and private co-finance mobilised.\textsuperscript{16} This means that developed countries provide financial resources to multilateral actors, such as Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) or the Financial Mechanism to the UNFCCC (e.g. Global Environment Facility (GEF), Green Climate Fund (GCF)), but an allocation depends on the respective programming processes of these intermediary actors.\textsuperscript{17} The same accounts for contributions by the private sector. Those actors have already engaged voluntarily in announcing targets for climate-related spending, for example the joint statement by MDBs on the margins of COP21 or several pledges by the business community made throughout the One Planet Summit in November 2017.\textsuperscript{18} Consequently, a comprehensive system to ensure predictability may also comprise those groups of actors and provide them with a platform for reporting their future climate change provision plans.\textsuperscript{19}

2.2 Information: What shall be reported?

When the negotiations on Article 9.5 started, Parties could already base their work on experience from existing ex-ante reporting arrangements for developed Parties made at COP19. Under a decision on long-term climate finance, developed country Parties were asked “to prepare biennial submissions on their updated strategies and approaches for scaling up climate finance from 2014 to 2020, including any available information on quantitative and qualitative elements of a pathway”\textsuperscript{20}. This should include, among other items, information to increase clarity on the expected levels of climate finance. During the round-table discussion on the process to identify information to be provided under Article 9.5 at SB46 in May 2017, Parties used provisions made at COP19 as a starting point to further identify potential information to be included in the reporting (see Table 2).\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{15} UNFCCC SCF (2016). Remarks on the data used to assess South-South cooperation: “Data are limited, and mainly sourced from the OECD DAC, complemented with reports from a small number of other countries.” (p. 4)

\textsuperscript{16} UNFCCC SCF (2016), p. 51.

\textsuperscript{17} In the case of multilateral channels developed countries do play a role in terms of their agenda setting (e.g. Board of Governors at the World Bank Groups consisting of representatives for each member country, Board of the Green Climate Fund including representatives from developed countries). However, this still represents an intermediary step in allocating resources provided to these institutions.

\textsuperscript{18} African Development Bank et al. (2015), UNFCCC (2017a)

\textsuperscript{19} The Financial Mechanism to the UNFCCC (Global Environment Facility, including Special Climate Change Fund and Least Developed Countries Fund; the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation Fund) is taking up a special role in this regard, because the Parties are mandated to provide direct guidance to these entities. For example, they could request the GCF to provide more detailed information ex-ante on its spending practice.

\textsuperscript{20} Decision 3/CP. 19, paragraph 10

\textsuperscript{21} UNFCCC (2017a)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Types of information required for the preparation of biennial submissions of developed country Parties in accordance with decision 3/CP.19, paragraph 10</th>
<th>Non-exhaustive considerations for potential types of information in the context of Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information to increase clarity on the expected levels of climate finance mobilized from different sources</td>
<td>Enhancing information on expected levels of climate finance through bilateral and other regional channels</td>
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<td>Enhancing information on expected levels of climate finance through multilateral channels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information on policies, programmes and priorities</td>
<td>Information on how expected levels of climate finance reflect the needs and priorities of developing country Parties, including specific information with regard to countries that are vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change</td>
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<td>Information on enhancing access to climate finance</td>
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<td>Information on actions and plans to mobilize additional finance</td>
<td>Information on the relationship between public interventions used and private finance mobilized</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Information on actions taken and plans to mobilize finance for the implementation of nationally determined contributions and national adaptation plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information on how the balance between adaptation and mitigation is ensured, in particular the needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change</td>
<td>Information on how Parties ensure the balance between adaptation and mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information on expected levels of adaptation finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information on steps taken to enhance enabling environments, following on from the report of the co-chairs of the extended work programme on long-term finance</td>
<td>Information on how support is aligned with Article 2, paragraph 1(e), of the Paris Agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Illustration of potential types of information in the context of Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2017a)

What also informed the round-table debate were the experiences shared by developed country parties in preparing those submissions. They highlighted that it was a useful exercise, for example to start engaging with relevant national authorities involved in budgetary planning, but also uncovered some challenges and gaps in relation to the availability of ex-ante information. As mentioned in the background chapter, these include constraints imposed by budgetary cycles (e.g. some countries perform climate finance planning only on an annual basis), limitations in projecting future levels of private climate finance leveraged, barriers in providing very detailed information on future expenditures (e.g. geographical area, thematic coverage) and the fact that programming allocations to developing countries is demand-driven, i.e. depending on a dialogue with those

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22 UNFCCC (2017a): “Australia, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland were invited to share their experience based on existing arrangements, including with regard to the preparation of the biennial submissions.” (p. 4)
countries and requiring flexibility.\textsuperscript{23} The synthesis on the submissions prepared for COP23 reveals how those challenges and gaps played out in gathering the necessary data. As the information on expected levels of climate finance shows, developed countries were only able to provide very rudimentary quantitative information for the upcoming years (e.g. an estimation of an annual allocation of climate finance or an estimation for an amount for the period until 2020).\textsuperscript{24} An exception to this, also highlighted in the round-table discussion, are commitments made to the Financial Mechanism of the Convention (e.g. GCF, GEF), which are available to a more detailed degree. Following the presentation of experiences by developed country parties on strategies and approaches, developing countries took note that there was a difference in approaches as well as in the level of detail of information. Thus, they stated an “insufficiency in the provision of quantitative information on expected levels of climate finance through multilateral channels”\textsuperscript{25}. However, as the categories in the left column of Table 2 show, provisions on what information to include and how to present it were quite open. Furthermore, responsibility of developed Parties could be improved. Until COP23, not all developed countries had followed the request made at COP19. Parties that had not yet submitted information on strategies and approaches were urged to do so as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{26}

The most recent provisional list of information to be considered under Article 9.5 is included in the joint reflections note by the presiding officers of the APA, the SBSTA and the SBI from October 2018.\textsuperscript{27} It contains 11 categories and several sub-categories of quantitative and qualitative information on expected levels of climate finance. The current draft of the PAWP includes 10 submissions from negotiation groups or Parties with opinions on what further information to include, whether there are duplications and to make remarks about a potential structure for the information.\textsuperscript{28} The submissions provide insight into the priorities of negotiating Parties that have already been reflected to a certain degree in the draft decision text of the joint reflections note, and give hints where there might be still contentious negotiation items. For instance, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), the Group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) argued for strengthening the presence of loss and damage and requested more clarity as to how most vulnerable countries are considered within the projected climate finance information, which has been incorporated in the draft text. The Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) requests more detailed information on the programming processes in developed countries, including information on how priorities are set in provider countries, the share of administrative cost or overhead of projects, on due diligence requirements for cooperation and how challenges to facilitate or mobilize support have been encountered. This has not yet been addressed in the draft text. Australia and Canada suggested to include further information on how Parties tend to integrate climate change in development cooperation and how the effectiveness of climate finance spending will be increased, which is also present in the current draft annex. The European Union (EU) also convinced the other Parties to add certain information to the draft annex, for example on how financial support can help to make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas and climate resilient development, information on national planning and budgetary processes as well as on sectors and geographies to which parties intend to provide support. The United States of America (USA) argue in their submission to include information on efforts to reduce international support for maladaptive investments, how international climate finance efforts do not crowd out domestic public and private climate finance or how support should be designed to be

\textsuperscript{23}UNFCCC (2017a), p. 5
\textsuperscript{24}UNFCCC (2017c), p. 5f
\textsuperscript{25}UNFCCC (2017a), p. 5
\textsuperscript{26}Decision 6/CP.23, paragraph 4
\textsuperscript{27}APA, SBSTA and SBI (2018)
\textsuperscript{28}UNFCCC (2018c), p. 153ff
time bound and with an aim to enhance long-term domestic capacity and transition away from international support. This information has not yet been reflected in the most recent draft list. With regards to structuring the information, there are two predominant opinions. Some negotiation groups suggest a split between quantitative and qualitative information (African Group of Negotiators (AGN), Like-Minded Group of Developing Countries (LMDC), LDCs, AILAC) while other Parties recommend a thematic split of information (EU, Switzerland, USA), which may contain both quantitative and qualitative information. Currently, the latter option has been included in the draft text for CMA as presented in the joint reflections note.

As highlighted by AILAC, the experience with the biennial communication of strategies and approaches for scaling up climate finance from 2014 to 2020 may provide a valuable basis for reporting climate finance ex ante under the PA. Yet, the identified barriers to deliver climate finance projections hamper the provision of information as suggested in the current draft of the PAWP. There is the need to find a compromise between the needs and interests of recipients and the challenges providers of climate finance face. Some experts suggest a feasible approach, keeping in mind that some of them might not be available straight away. For instance, the Project for Advancing Climate Transparency (PACT) suggests that Parties could adopt a tiered approach.

This would mean that “some qualitative and quantitative information on provision and mobilization of climate finance deemed applicable to all developed country Parties is mandatory to communicate, while information on projected levels of public financial resources should be communicated as available”\(^{29}\). In addition, PACT stresses that developed country parties should give a justification in case certain data is not available. This would create a focus on the most crucial set of information, require proper justification if data cannot be provided, and also leave some flexibility to reporting Parties.

### 2.3 Modalities: How shall be reported?

As already prescribed by Article 9.5, developed country Parties are asked to provide climate finance projections on a biennial basis. As it has not been defined for which timeframe they shall predict their climate-related spending, it leaves them with some flexibility to report according to their budgetary planning processes. As the experiences with the submissions on expected levels of climate finance have shown, some countries might be able to give long-term projections (e.g. until 2020), while others are limited by annual budgetary planning for climate finance.\(^{30}\) Nevertheless, providing updated information in a two-year-cycle should be feasible, while striving to increase the timeframe of predictable climate finance. As planning processes in developing countries often take place in greater timeframes, recipient Parties have a strong interest to receive information well in advance.

Further decisions on the modalities of operationalizing Article 9.5 are currently reflected in the options presented in the joint statement by APA, SBSTA and SBI.\(^{31}\) They are based on negotiations in the APA context and have also been brought up under the SBI through a submission by the AGN and the LMDC.\(^{32}\) The two negotiation groups suggest to “establish a registry of the information communicated by developed country Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5”\(^{33}\) and “requests the UNFCCC Secretariat to prepare a synthesis report for consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement”\(^{34}\). Furthermore, what has not yet been incorporated in the draft text of the joint reflections note, is that AGN and LMDC suggest to link reporting under Article 9.5 to the enhanced transparency framework by pro-

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\(^{29}\) Dagnet et al. (2018), p. 24

\(^{30}\) UNFCCC (2017c), p. 5f

\(^{31}\) APA, SBSTA and SBI (2018), p. 2f

\(^{32}\) APA (2018b), p. 3; UNFCCC (2018c), p. 154ff

\(^{33}\) APA (2018b), p. 3

\(^{34}\) Ibid.
posing to “initiate the facilitative multilateral consideration of progress and technical expert review of information provided and reported by developed country Parties and constituted bodies under the Paris Agreement in accordance with Article 13.9, 13.11 and 13.12”.

This would create a strong link between reporting obligations under Article 9 and 13 and involve that institutions and processes mandated to oversee the enhanced transparency framework would also be responsible for reviewing ex-ante information on climate finance. Whether this will be added to the final draft recommendation for the CMA is still subject to negotiations.

Concerning the institutions that should be involved in overseeing this process, the PACT project refers to the UNFCCC Secretariat as a potential focal point, which is also included in the current draft options for the CMA. This is based on existing processes in relation to the biennial submissions of strategies and approaches that involve the Secretariat as the body mandated to collect the submissions and to prepare a synthesis report for the COP. In addition, PACT suggests the results of this reporting could be evaluated in a biennial high-level ministerial dialogue convened by the CMA. This would grant more attention to the kind of information provided, that have so far been presented as submission documents on strategies and approaches ahead of the COP. It would also create more pressure for developed country Parties that have failed to provide such information, as it is still the case for some Parties in relation to submissions on strategies and approaches. Finally, the suggestion to introduce a new, biennial dialogue format is also to be seen in the bigger picture on how much room will be given to the topic of climate finance within post-2020 negotiations. This refers to the work programme on long-term climate finance (LTF), including annual in-session workshops and biennial high-level ministerial dialogues.

Launched at COP17, the work programme on LTF has provided important opportunities for Parties as well as Observers to reflect on the current state of climate finance and to exchange views on strengths and shortcomings of the system. As per the setup of the work programme, those reflective events will terminate in 2020, leaving the Global Stocktake (GST) under PA currently as the main replacement option for exchange. As the GST will only take place every 5 years, starting in 2023, PACT argues that a more frequent format would do more justice to the dynamic nature of climate finance and is therefore recommendable as a modality for Article 9.5.

3 Synthesis and recommendations

Work on Article 9.5 of the PA has been split among different negotiation streams. At COP24, the major work on this matter will be conducted under the SBI. As part of their overall mandate to oversee the advancement of the PAWP, the APA might also get involved into finalizing the negotiation process. The results of the SBI will be forwarded as recommended text elements for the PAWP to the COP, which will forward their recommendations to the CMA for consideration and adoption. The APA might forward their additions directly to the CMA. Alongside these negotiation streams, there will be informal negotiations among the Parties and their representatives within the different bodies.

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35 Ibid.
36 Dagnall et al. (2018), p. 27
37 Decision 6/CP.23, paragraph 4
38 UNFCCC (2018d)
39 Dagnall et al. (2018), p. 27
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<th>Negotiating Body</th>
<th>Agenda Item</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Next Step</th>
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<tr>
<td>APA(^{40})</td>
<td>8 (b). Taking stock of progress made by the subsidiary and constituted bodies in relation to their mandated work under the Paris Agreement and section III of decision 1/CP.21, in order to promote and facilitate coordination and coherence in the implementation of the work programme, and, if appropriate, take action, which may include recommendations</td>
<td>At APA 1.6, consideration of the possible additional matters related to implementation of the PA continued. It included, among other topics, modalities for biennially communicating finance information on the provision of public financial resources to developing countries in accordance with Article 9.5. The APA identified two Options: Option 1 is text elements to define modalities in relation to reporting under 9.5 and Option 2 is to make no recommendation at all.</td>
<td>The APA will be invited to continue its consideration of these matters, based on the Bangkok outcome, with a view to concluding its consideration thereof at this session. The APA will make recommendations to the CMA (Option 1 or a third, new Option) or not forward any recommendations to the CMA (Option 2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)(^1)</td>
<td>15. Matters relating to climate finance: identification of information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement</td>
<td>The status of work on this mandate is reflected in the overview of the work of the COP, SBs and CBs on the PAWP and includes a list of potential types of information to be considered as well as several submissions by Parties or groups of Parties.</td>
<td>The SBI will be invited to complete its work on the identification of the information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, and to forward the outcomes to the COP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference of the Parties (COP)(^2)</td>
<td>3 (b). Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation</td>
<td>The COP will be invited to take note of the progress in the work of the SBI in 2018 and to consider the</td>
<td>The COP will be invited to provide a recommendation for consideration and adoption by the CMA.</td>
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\(^{40}\) UNFCCC (2018e)  
\(^{41}\) UNFCCC (2018f)  
\(^{42}\) UNFCCC (2018g)
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<th><strong>10 (e). Identification of the information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement</strong></th>
<th><strong>recommended draft decisions and conclusions for adoption.</strong></th>
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<td><strong>Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA)</strong></td>
<td><strong>3. Matters relating to the implementation of the Paris Agreement</strong></td>
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**Table 2: Negotiation streams for Article 9.5 at Katowice Climate Change Conference (own compilation)**

Based on the analysis of key aspects from the discussion on operationalizing Article 9.5, the following recommendations can enhance the possibility for a streamlined outcome:

**Actors**
- Developed country Parties, who are obliged to report ex-ante information, should build their processes on the experiences of the biennial submissions mandated by COP19. They should collectively work on advancing the level of detail in their projections.
- As historic data on climate finance flows has shown, South-South cooperation is a relevant factor in climate finance. Other Parties should therefore consider reporting under Article 9.5 and apply the same modalities as developed country Parties. Developed Parties should support these Parties in this process, for instance through capacity building.
- Parties to the PA should invite other relevant actors of the climate finance landscape (e.g. MDBs, private sector) to also engage in the provision of ex-ante climate finance information.

**Information**
- Considering the wealth of information that needs to be provided and the barriers identified to provide such information well in advance, reporting parties might apply a tiered approach.
- If developed countries cannot provide the agreed data and information, there should be a sufficient justification.
- Quantitative information should be favoured above qualitative information, which should be also expressed in the structuring of information.

**Modalities**
- All reporting Parties should apply the same modalities in their reporting.
- It should be discussed whether reporting under Article 9.5 might be linked to other reporting processes that apply the same timeframe (e.g. Article 13).
- One or more entities shall be assigned to oversee the reporting under Article 9.5 (e.g. UNFCCC Secretariat) and to ensure the technical review of information submitted. A registry might be a helpful element for operationalizing a more streamlined reporting.
- As the visibility of information in the biennial submission of strategies and approaches has

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43 UNFCCC (2018h)
been rather limited, Parties should think about a process of granting more attention to the in-
formation provided (e.g. high-level ministerial dialogue). This is also to be seen in the light of maintaining the benefits of the work pro-
gramme on LTF, which will terminate in 2020.
Abbreviations

APA  Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement
AGN  African Group of Negotiators
AILAC  Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean
AOSIS  Alliance of Small Island States
BA  Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows
CMA  Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement
COP  Conference of the Parties
EIG  Environmental Integrity Group
GCF  Green Climate Fund
GEF  Global Environment Facility
GST  Global Stocktake
EU  European Union
LDCs  Group of Least Developed Countries
LMDC  Like Minded Group of Developing Countries
LTF  Long-Term Climate Finance
MDBs  Multilateral Development Banks
NDCs  Nationally Determined Contributions
PA  Paris Agreement
Parties  Parties to the UNFCCC
PAWP  Paris Agreement Work Programme
SBs  Subsidiary Bodies (SBSTA and SBI)
SBI  Subsidiary Body of Implementation
SBSTA  Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SCF  Standing Committee on Finance
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USA  United States of America
Bibliography


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